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THE CURIOUS CASE OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER: 
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY 
Ian Bartrum* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Greece, New York, as in many other places around the country, the 
town board begins its monthly meetings with a prayer.1 While the audience 
members—including town residents and employees with matters pending 
before the board—bow their heads or join in, a chosen “chaplain of the 
month” delivers an invocation before the governing body’s business 
begins.2 The Town has had no formal policy for selecting this chaplain, but 
by regular practice, a municipal employee solicits volunteers from among 
those religious groups listed in the community guide and local newspaper. 
Until 2008, the list included only Christian organizations.3 And, although no 
town official reviews the content of the prayers before they are delivered, a 
“substantial majority” of those given have “contained uniquely Christian 
language.”4 Two town residents objected to the practice in 2007, and they 
filed suit when their complaints went largely unheeded.5 Eventually, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the prayers “impermissibly affiliated the 
town with a single creed, Christianity,”6 and in the spring of 2012 the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Then, in a development few saw coming, 
the United States filed an amicus brief in the summer of 2013—in support 
of the Town.7 
All of this gives rise to at least two interesting questions. First, why did 
the Court choose to reconsider the question now, when it approved (for the 
most part) of legislative prayer just thirty years ago in Marsh v. Chambers?8 
Second, why would the Solicitor General enter into this dispute in support 
of a practice that pushes the boundaries of what the Court found acceptable 
in Marsh? In this Essay, I speculate that the answers to these two questions 
 
*
 Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to Chris Lund for insight 
and comments, and to the Online editors for their hard work and guidance. 
1
  Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2
  Id. at 23. 
3
  Id. at 24. 
4
  Id. 
5
  Id. at 25. 
6
  Id. at 22. 
7
  Eyder Peralta, Obama Administration, GOP Agree on Opening Prayers Case, NPR: THE TWO-
WAY (Aug. 9, 2013, 11:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/09/210498961/obama-
administration-gop-agree-on-opening-prayers-case. 
8
  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 219 
are interrelated. The Court has taken the case, in all likelihood, because 
some Justices see an opportunity to reconsider the so-called endorsement 
test that now governs many Establishment Clause questions, and the 
Solicitor has entered the fray to preserve that same test, even if it means that 
some sectarian legislative prayers are constitutional. 
I. WHY REVISIT LEGISLATIVE PRAYER? 
To begin thinking about why the Court would revisit the question of 
legislative prayer, it is necessary to locate Marsh within the body of 
Establishment Clause doctrine. In 1980, Nebraska State Senator Ernie 
Chambers challenged the state’s tradition of having a chaplain open 
legislative sessions with a prayer.9 A divided Court upheld the practice for 
largely historical reasons, with the caveat that the prayers must be 
nonsectarian, that they not “proselytize or advance any one, or . . . disparage 
any other, faith or belief.”10 In light of an “unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years”11 of legislative prayer, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger created an exception to the general Establishment Clause test that he 
had fashioned just a decade earlier in Lemon v. Kurtzman.12 As a result, 
Marsh seems to suggest, a bit uncomfortably, that legislative prayer is 
something of a constitutional anomaly. To borrow Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s phrase from oral argument in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
perhaps legislative prayer is a “historical aberration”13—born of an 
unprincipled practice that seemed relatively harmless when the national 
population was overwhelmingly Protestant.14 Indeed, James Madison, the 
First Amendment’s primary author, labeled legislative prayer an 
unconstitutional irregularity that he hoped would not distort our future 
understanding of the Establishment Clause.15 Nonetheless, the anomaly has 
persisted. 
Despite this, and the dissenters’ hope that Marsh had “carv[ed] out an 
exception to the Establishment Clause” rather than reshaped the law, the 
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decision could not remain entirely independent of the general Establishment 
Clause doctrine.16 Since the Clause’s incorporation against the states in 
Everson v. Board of Education,17 the doctrine has developed along several 
axes, the most germane of which has been an ongoing debate over the 
meaning of state “neutrality” in religious matters. I have argued elsewhere 
that this debate has largely involved two competing visions of neutrality: an 
“exclusive” vision, which would banish all religion from the public square, 
and an “inclusive” vision, which would attempt to accommodate all 
religious viewpoints equally.18 The Court announced the exclusive 
paradigm in Everson itself—“[n]either [a state nor the federal government] 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another”19—and this approach would later undergird the Lemon test.20 
Perhaps the best expression of the inclusive approach came just a few years 
later in Zorach v. Clauson: 
 We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being. . . . [The state should] respect[] the religious nature of our people and 
accommodate[] the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may 
not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government 
show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those 
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.21 
The theoretical divide is thus quite straightforward: exclusivists believe that 
the only feasible way for the state to remain neutral is to carefully avoid all 
religious speech or activity, while inclusivists contend that such an 
approach actually establishes an irreligious or secular viewpoint at the 
expense of all others.22 
Everson, Lemon, and Zorach all addressed the relationship between 
religion and public schooling, however, and the exclusive–inclusive debate 
has played out somewhat differently in the context of state involvement 
with religious displays.23 There the doctrine has evolved to ask whether a 
display would cause a reasonable observer to view the government as 
endorsing a particular religion.24 This so-called endorsement test—which 
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has emerged out of Lemon’s second prong—is rooted in an exclusivist 
vision of state neutrality, and it has thus long troubled the Court’s more 
inclusivist Justices.25 Some, like Justice Antonin Scalia, would like to see it 
replaced with a “coercion test,” which would ask only whether a 
government practice actually coerces citizens into a specific religious 
activity “by force of law and threat of penalty.”26 Justice Anthony Kennedy 
would also look to coercion rather than endorsement, but would find that 
coercion manifests itself in more subtle kinds of psychological pressures.27 
Justice Clarence Thomas, for his part, has repeatedly suggested that the 
Establishment Clause might not apply against the state governments at all.28 
These objections notwithstanding, the endorsement approach has had 
majority support for nearly twenty-five years,29 and so inclusivists have 
focused instead on making the test sympathetic to some kinds of religious 
speech or symbolism. The general thrust of this effort has been to suggest 
that certain symbols or speech actually endorse a historical or secular 
message rather than (or in addition to) a particularized religious viewpoint.30 
Legislative prayer has drifted, rather uneasily, into the lee of these 
inclusivist exceptions. Perhaps it has become a secularized act of “civic 
religion”;31 or perhaps striking such prayers down at this point in our history 
is just too controversial.32 But the composition of the Court has shifted in 
the years since the last relevant case—possibly in favor of those who would 
do away with these tenuous rationales in favor of a straight-out coercion 
test.33 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who forged and championed the 
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Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31 (2010), reprinted in 
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1653, 1655–56 (2010). 
26
  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27
  Id. at 592–93 (majority opinion); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660–62 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (considering forces like peer or social 
pressures potentially coercive). 
28
  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
29
  The notable exception is Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court applied Kennedy’s psychological 
coercion test to strike down a prayer before a middle school graduation. 505 U.S. at 592–93. 
30
  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (finding Latin cross had taken on 
secular meanings as a war memorial); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687–89 (2005) (approving of 
state’s recognition of “the role of God in our Nation’s heritage”). 
31
  The concept of civic religion is that the prayer is no longer offered for its religious content, but 
for its historical and traditional significance. See generally Bartrum, supra note 25. 
32
  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (It may be “that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, one 
which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not.”); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (striking down a monument of the Decalogue would “tend to promote the 
kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid”). 
33
  It is certainly worth noting here that even the most demanding versions of the coercion test would 
not seem to permit the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh itself, which are given by chaplains paid out 
of the state coffers. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983). In such cases, of course, the tax 
code coerces all citizens into supporting the prayers. 
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endorsement test, has retired. Her replacement, Justice Samuel Alito, has 
expressed some skepticism about the approach.34 And so it is within this 
uncertain doctrinal context that the Court has chosen to revisit the 
problematic question of legislative prayer. 
There seem to be at least two potential reasons why the Court has 
decided to intervene now. The first is that Marsh has proven too difficult to 
apply in practice, and thus some Justices may be ready to put the 
problematic constitutional anomaly to rest once and for all. The second, and 
more likely, possibility is that the Court’s inclusivists believe they finally 
have the votes to do away with the endorsement test. 
Although it seems unlikely that the Court would overturn Marsh now, 
there are very real concerns that lend credence to the argument for striking 
down legislative prayer. Nobody has done more to chronicle these 
difficulties than Chris Lund, and his insights are instructive here.35 First, 
Lund has observed that the nonsectarian requirement is, in itself, difficult to 
define and apply in the context of legislative prayer.36 This stems in part 
from the fact that prayers can never truly be nonsectarian. There will always 
be someone who disagrees with the message conveyed—at the very least 
atheists may take offense, as responding counsel Douglas Laycock 
conceded during oral argument in Galloway37—and so the question then 
becomes one of degree. The hope is for as little sectarianism as possible; 
but in practice, Marsh’s blurriness inevitably opens the door to political 
pressures, which predictably tend to favor majoritarian religious 
viewpoints.38 It has also caused judicial uncertainty, with some courts 
adopting a fairly strict nonsectarian rule while others permit prayers unless 
they run afoul of Marsh’s ban on “proselytizing.”39 The long-term result of 
this uncertainty is that the appropriate content of legislative prayers remains 
among the most controverted church–state questions in our national life.40 
Moreover, even if courts are able to delineate the precise contours of a 
nonsectarian prayer, there might still be serious constitutional obstacles to 
imposing such a requirement on prayer givers. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court 
struck down an invocation at a middle school graduation ceremony in part 
because, by distributing “Guidelines for Civic Occasions” and advising 
celebrants to keep their message nonsectarian, the school principal had 
“directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”41 The school had 
 
34
  See discussion infra notes 54–55. 
35
  Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010). 
36
  See id. at 994–1013. 
37
  Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 31–32. 
38
  Lund, supra note 35, at 1039–42. 
39
  See id. at 1011–12 (discussing Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
40
  See id. at 975–76. 
41
  505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992). 
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violated a “cornerstone principle”42 of the Establishment Clause by 
attempting to “compose official prayers” for use at a public function.43 Lund 
has called this strain of doctrine the “[c]ensorship [o]bjection,”44 and these 
concerns no doubt informed the Town of Greece’s decision not to formally 
review or oversee the content of their opening prayers. Indeed, at oral 
argument several Justices expressed some concern that any detailed 
prescription the Court could hand down in these circumstances might 
present the same difficulties.45 All of this leaves Marsh’s requirement that 
legislative prayers be nonsectarian, or at least nonproselytizing, in a very 
precarious position: even where there is agreement on some basic premises 
about the standard, courts and administrators cannot constitutionally 
enforce those terms upon prayer givers. Little wonder, then, that some have 
suggested that Marsh is unworkable in practice and that the Court would be 
better off doing away with the anomaly of legislative prayer once and for 
all.46 
In truth, however, it seems very unlikely that the Court has taken this 
case in order to eliminate legislative prayer. Legislative prayer is ensconced 
very deeply among our national traditions, and, as Justice Elena Kagan 
noted at oral argument, any effort to displace it now would open the Court 
to the familiar charge of being “hostile to religion.”47 Much more likely is 
the possibility that some members of the Court see the case as an 
opportunity to do away with the endorsement test. 
For these Justices, Marsh’s practical failings are really just the failings 
of the endorsement approach writ large—it is impossible to identify what 
should count as an “endorsement” of religion generally, and any effort to 
decide inevitably involves the state in questions that it is incompetent to 
answer. And the extreme exclusivist solution—ending the practice 
altogether—would abandon neutrality in favor of an irreligious or secular 
viewpoint. Thus, rather than eliminate all legislative prayers, the inclusivist 
resolution is to permit virtually all prayers, so long as they are not actively 
coercive. This debate is really one of constitutional first principles, and it is 
worth taking a quick look at the competing ideas.48 
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test—formulated in concurrence in 
Lynch v. Donnelly and adopted by the Court in Allegheny v. ACLU—is 
rooted in the belief that the Establishment Clause promises Americans 
 
42
  Id. 
43
  Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). 
44
  Lund, supra note 35, at 1013. 
45
  See Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 33–35. 
46
  Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2013). 
47
  Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 52. 
48
  See Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35–36, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. at 1657–58. 
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something like a secular state.49 Perhaps akin to the French notion of laïcité, 
the “secular state” view of disestablishment asserts that government should 
set aside all religion in favor of secular rationales and policies.50 By 
contrast, the coercion test—in either Justice Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s 
formulation—seems to view the Establishment Clause as simply 
supplementing the Free Exercise Clause in protecting individual 
conceptions of religious duty against state intrusion.51 Under the “religious 
duty” view, an Establishment violation arises only when the state forces us 
to choose between our civic obligations and our duties to God.52 From these 
divergent views emerge many of the seemingly intractable difficulties with 
which the Justices wrestled in oral argument: a religious duty conception 
sees efforts to police or eliminate legislative prayers as hostile towards 
religion, while a secular state conception worries that the state’s imprimatur 
on particular religious practices makes nonadherents feel excluded.53 It is, in 
all likelihood, the contest between these basic conceptions of 
disestablishment that underlies the Court’s decision to revisit legislative 
prayer. 
The salient question is whether a majority of the Court is, in fact, ready 
to replace the endorsement test with a coercion analysis. Given previous 
opinions, it is probably safe to count Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy 
among those who would welcome such a change. And in Salazar v. Buono, 
decided in 2010, Justice Alito made some skeptical noises about the 
propriety of the endorsement test—although that case’s odd procedural 
posture did not permit the Court to actually decide that question.54 It is 
certainly possible that Justice Alito would do away with the endorsement 
test if given the chance, and at oral argument he seemed dubious about the 
practicality of imposing any nonendorsement or nonsectarian kind of 
 
49
  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–96 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
50
  Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L. REV. at 
1657–58. The reasoning here is something like that given in John Rawls’s account of public reasoning. 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (expanded ed. 2005). Laïcité is the French term for keeping 
government matters among the lay people and out of the hands of the clergy. In practice, the principle 
promises that the government will be secular in some sense, as opposed to the American idea that there 
simply will be no official state church. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A 
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 419–25. 
51
  See Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. at 1657. 
52
  Id. 
53
  See, in particular, the comments of Justice Scalia, Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 
40–41, Justice Kagan, id. at 52, and Justice Sotomayor, id. at 20–22. 
54
  130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Assuming that it is appropriate to apply the 
so-called ‘endorsement test,’ this test would not be violated [given these facts].”). The Court in Salazar 
was asked only whether the government’s decision to sell the land on which a Latin cross stood was an 
impermissible effort to evade an earlier injunction. Id. at 1815–16. Thus, the endorsement test was 
already the law of the case. Id. at 1816. 
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standard on legislative prayer givers.55 If Justice Alito does side with the 
coercionists, it would require only one more vote to accomplish the change; 
and, if we can read anything meaningful into the oral argument, that vote 
might come from either Justice Kagan or Justice Roberts. Justice Kagan is a 
particularly interesting possibility. In addition to voicing her worries about 
appearing “hostile to religion,”56 she opened the questioning by reading one 
of the more sectarian prayers given in Greece and asking counsel to 
hypothesize whether he would have felt coerced to participate had the Chief 
Justice asked the room to stand while it was read before arguments began.57 
Taking her comments together, it could be that Justice Kagan is willing to 
sign on to the coercion test, but would conclude that the Town’s practice in 
Greece violates even that more deferential standard. 
There are a number of observers who believe, or perhaps hope, that the 
Court has taken this case for just this reason.58 Ken Klukowski forthrightly 
suggested as much on the influential SCOTUSblog: 
 The Court should take the rule it implicitly used in Marsh—looking to 
history and coercion—and hold that this is not some carve-out from the 
Establishment Clause: instead, it is the correct understanding of the 
Establishment Clause. Lemon and Allegheny should be overruled, and the 
coercion test restored as the test the Constitution requires.59 
Nevertheless, even the coercion test’s proponents acknowledge that it 
presents its own share of problems. Justice Scalia, for example, expressly 
acknowledged one of the test’s principal shortcomings during oral 
argument: 
[I]f coercion is the test . . . of the Establishment Clause, why do we need the 
Establishment Clause? If there’s coercion, I assume it would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, wouldn’t it?  
 . . . . 
So it seems to me very unlikely that the test for the Establishment Clause is 
identical to the test for the Free Exercise Clause.60 
From a textualist perspective, the coercion test threatens to make one of the 
two religion clauses redundant, a significant objection to those who 
 
55
  See Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 30–33. 
56
  Id. at 52. 
57
  Id. at 3–5. 
58
  See, e.g., Steven Smith, Town of Greece v. Galloway Symposium: The End of “No 
Endorsement”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 2013/10/town-
of-galloway-v-greece-symposium-the-end-of-no-endorsement. 
59
  Ken Klukowski, Symposium: Time to Restore Longstanding Meaning—and Sanity—to the 




  Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 35–36. 
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consider themselves strict constructionists of constitutional meaning. With 
that said, however, it is the possibility of exactly this sort of Establishment 
Clause sea change—a move from the endorsement to the coercion 
analysis—that best explains the Court’s decision to revisit Marsh and 
legislative prayer. 
II. WHY DID THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SUPPORT THE TOWN? 
The Solicitor General’s decision to file an amicus brief in support of 
the Town caught many observers off guard.61 Why, they wondered, would 
the Solicitor’s office argue that the prayers at issue in Greece—most of 
which adopt an identifiably Christian tone—are nonsectarian in the sense 
that Marsh requires? In truth, exactly what Marsh requires is a matter of 
some dispute, and it would be perfectly understandable if the Obama 
Administration wanted to stay above that politicized fray. So it has to count 
as somewhat of a surprise that the Solicitor would go on the record 
contending that the Second Circuit erred in applying Marsh too stringently. 
Indeed, it suggests that the Solicitor, too, recognizes the potential threat to 
the endorsement test and has entered the case in order to give the Court 
another option—preserve the endorsement test, but conclude that most 
sectarian legislative prayers are permissible as a historically entrenched 
exception. 
The arguments advanced in the Solicitor’s brief tend to support this 
theory of his involvement in the case. He is at pains to emphasize the 
unique place that legislative prayer occupies in Establishment Clause 
doctrine; indeed, the brief repeatedly suggests that Marsh announced a 
special test that applies only to this particular, historically justified 
practice.62 In this way, the Solicitor is able to argue that neither the 
endorsement test nor the coercion test should apply in Galloway. Rather, 
Marsh “established that the practice of providing an opportunity for a 
prayer at the beginning of a legislative body’s day or session, when not 
exploited to proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith or belief does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.”63 If this is true, the Court would seem to 
have no occasion to revisit the endorsement test, as the question simply is 
not presented. Further, the Solicitor’s brief attempts to allay fears about 
 
61
  See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer Goes Back to the Supreme Court: And This 
Time the Obama Administration Is on the Side of Prayer, SLATE (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/the_supreme_court_will_have_
another_chance_to_decide_when_government_can.html; Nelson Tebbe & Micah Schwartzman, 
Symposium: The Puzzle of Town of Greece v. Galloway, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/symposium-the-puzzle-of-town-of-greece-v-galloway. 
62
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–16, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013) (repeatedly characterizing Marsh as establishing an 
exception to Establishment jurisprudence). 
63
  Id. at 9. 
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state censorship of prayer givers by suggesting that Marsh does not 
“[p]ermit[] [a] [c]ourt [t]o [p]arse [t]he [s]ectarian [c]ontent [o]f 
[legislative] [p]rayers.”64 While such parsing would be necessary if courts 
had to apply the endorsement test, the special Marsh standard requires 
much less official oversight. Thus, if the Court is willing to leave the 
endorsement test alone, the Solicitor is willing to concede the 
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayers. 
Ian Gershengorn’s oral argument on behalf of the United States also 
evidences the intent to insulate the endorsement test by placing legislative 
prayer in a doctrinal category of its own. The clearest indication of this 
tactic came in a short exchange with Justice Scalia, who seemed eager to 
test the Solicitor’s principles and motives. Justice Sotomayor had pressed 
Gershengorn to explain why Greece’s practice was not coercive, and, after 
he distinguished between prayer in legislative and quasi-judicial contexts, 
Justice Scalia jumped at his opportunity: 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: You agree that coercion is the test, however? 
 MR. GERSHENGORN: We don’t agree that coercion is the test, Your 
Honor. 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: If it is the test— 
 MR. GERSHENGORN: . . . [W]e think there are three pillars in Marsh: 
First of all, that the history is what the Court looks to first. . . . Second, that the 
Court should be very wary of parsing prayer to make sectarian judgments. And 
third, what Marsh said is that adults are less susceptible [than children] to 
religious doctrine—indoctrination and peer pressure.65 
Gershengorn’s Marsh interpretation asks very different questions than does 
the endorsement test, but—probably more importantly—the coercion test is 
equally inappropriate in this context. Again, it seems the Solicitor is willing 
to turn a deferential eye to the historical aberration of sectarian (but 
nonproselytizing) legislative prayer if, in so doing, he can preserve the 
endorsement test’s place within some larger universe of Establishment 
cases. 
All of this, however, leaves one glaring question largely unanswered, 
and it is one Justice Sotomayor put to Gershengorn at oral argument: “And 
what was the purpose of Marsh saying that proselytizing or damning 
another religion would be a constitutional violation? . . . [U]nless you parse 
the prayers, you can’t determine whether there’s proselytizing or 
damnation.”66 That is to say, despite the government’s determined effort to 
advance Marsh as an alternative approach—one that avoids the problem of 
state censorship—even the more deferential proselytizing standard requires 
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some judicial oversight. Of course, the same problem would persist under 
the coercion test, except the parsing would be for coercive language or 
practices. Indeed, it would seem that the only way to truly avoid the 
censorship problem is to end the practice of legislative prayer altogether. 
But the Solicitor undoubtedly recognizes that, for the reasons I have offered 
above, this is a very unlikely result. Better, then, to cabin the problematic 
constitutional anomaly as closely as possible so that it does not undermine 
the larger body of disestablishment principle. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s qualified approval in 1983, legislative 
prayers such as those at issue in Town of Greece v. Galloway still give rise 
to some of the most difficult church–state questions alive today. In part, this 
is because the tradition of opening legislative sessions with a prayer 
predates the Constitutional Convention, and so—despite obvious 
Establishment problems—the Court has essentially grandfathered the 
practice into its constitutional doctrine. Nonetheless, there are always those 
that would see the exception made into the rule, and it seems likely that at 
least some members of the Court hope to use Galloway as an opportunity to 
revisit the larger contours of the Establishment Clause. In particular, they 
would like to replace Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test with a more 
permissive and deferential coercion test. Aware of this potential threat, the 
United States entered the case in order to reinforce legislative prayer’s 
unique status as a constitutional aberration—one that should not guide our 
general efforts to craft a coherent body of disestablishment doctrine. In this 
sense, the Solicitor simply reminds us of a warning James Madison offered 
nearly two centuries ago: we would do well to treat legislative prayer not as 
a “legitimate precedent,” but rather, in the words of Horace, as a “few blots 
carelessly spilt, or that human frailty could not avert.”67 
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  This is a rough translation of Horace’s Latin, from which Madison excerpted: “maculis quas aut 
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Poetica, in HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES, AND ARS POETICA 450, 478–79 (H. Rushton Fairclough trans., 
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